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Abstract—This paper evaluates the application of the specific 
Belgian mechanism to relief offshore wind power generation 
partially from the imbalance settlement mechanism. A tolerance 
margin for imbalances originating from offshore production 
deviations is installed in which producers and balancing 
responsible parties enjoy beneficial imbalance tariffs. 
This paper investigates background, conditions and financial 
implications of this regulation in order to determine if such 
support mechanisms can be adequate to support offshore wind 
power developments. 
 
Index Terms—imbalance settlement, offshore wind power, 
support mechanism, wind power integration 
I. INTRODUCTION: WIND POWER AND IMBALANCE 
SETTLEMENT 
NE of the main limitations for exploiting large shares of 
wind power generation is its variability. This power 
source depends on a variable input resulting in an output 
characterised by a limited controllability. Furthermore, wind 
power has a limited predictability.  
On the other hand, wind energy faces an electricity system 
which needs an instant balance between demand and supply. 
Combined with other characteristics such as limited storability 
and variable consumption, this requires a certain control over 
generation and/or consumption. One of the main challenges 
concerning wind power integration is consequently to balance  
(unpredicted) output fluctuations originating from the 
increasing shares of wind power in the electricity grid. 
To incentivise system balance, most power systems 
introduced imbalance settlement mechanisms [1]. Therefore, 
all market players operating in the Belgian electricity market 
are obliged to have a contract with a balancing responsible 
party (BRP). This BRP aggregates different market 
participants and maintains its portfolio in balance by ensuring 
that injections match off-takes for every 15 minutes. In order 
for the transmission system operator (TSO) to plan grid 
operations, these positions have to be sent as nominations to 
the TSO before gate closure, generally one day in advance. 
After this deadline, nominations can generally not be altered 
anymore. However, some tools exist to manage expected 
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imbalances after gate closure due to the availability of new 
information. These are specifically dealt with in another paper 
written by the author [2].  
When a BRP’s portfolio is not in balance at real-time, the 
BRP has to pay the imbalance tariff for the aggregated 
imbalances in its portfolio. If the total control zone 
(aggregation of all BRPs) is not in balance at real time, the 
TSO, as final responsible for the grid security, activates 
available reserve capacity in order to restore system balance. 
The imbalance settlement mechanism in Belgium is 
transparently available on the website of the TSO [3] and is 
represented in Table 1. 
Table 1 If a BRP faces a negative imbalance (injections + 
import + purchase < off-take + export + sales), it is said to be 
short and is consequently required to buy the missing 
electricity from the system operator above market price. On 
the other hand, if the BRP’s position is long, it has to sell its 
surplus to Elia under the market price. These imbalance tariffs 
are in best case 92% or 108% of the Belpex Day Ahead 
Market (Belpex DAM) price when the BRP’s imbalance 
counteracts with the system imbalance. In the other case, when 
the imbalance reinforces the system imbalance, the imbalance 
tariff is equal or lower than 92% or equal or higher than 108% 
and introduces an extra uncertain cost (risk) which depends on 
the volume and cost of the activated regulating reserves. 
 
TABLE 1 
IMBALANCE TARIFFS IN THE BELGIAN CONTROL ZONE (SOURCE: ELIA) 
 
Positive system 
imbalance 
Negative system 
imbalance 
Positive 
imbalance 
BRP 
(injection > 
off-take) 
• Max. 0.92 * Belpex DAM 
• Variable tariff depending 
on: 
1. Downward regulation 
volume 
2. Average downward 
regulation price 
3. Activated downward 
regulation price 
0,92 * Belpex DAM 
Negative 
imbalance 
BRP 
(injection < 
off-take) 
1,08 * Belpex DAM 
• Min. 1.08 * Belpex 
DAM 
• Variable tariff 
depending on: 
1. Upward regulation 
volume 
2. Average upward 
regulation price 
3. Activated upward 
regulation price 
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This system implies an additional cost for wind power 
generators which results from their inability to predict and 
nominate exactly the injection of wind generation. BRPs have 
to balance their positions with available flexible generation 
(portfolio or on the market) or face the imbalance tariff. This is 
not entirely new to the BRPs as they already gained experience 
with imbalances caused by load variations and power plant 
outages. However, experience with variable power sources is  
relatively new and while prediction tools are improving but 
still inaccurate. For a single wind power plant day-ahead 
output forecasts are characterised with a mean absolute error 
of 20% which may decrease until 5-7% one or two hours 
before real-time [4]. 
 To promote the integration of offshore wind power in 
Belgium, a specific support mechanism was installed aiming to 
reduce imbalance costs. This mechanism is based on a 
tolerance margin in which offshore wind power enjoys reduced 
imbalance tariffs. 
II. BELGIAN TOLERANCE MARGIN FOR OFFSHORE WIND 
POWER PRODUCTION 
A framework for this tolerance margin was shaped in the 
Royal Decree of 19 December 2002 (Grid Code). Article 317 
introduces the concept for renewable and CHP installations. 
The specific implementation of this article was however not 
yet defined. This was done later by the Royal Decree of March 
30, 2009, stipulating the execution of such tolerance margin 
for offshore wind power generation [5],[6]. This regulation 
came into force June, 3, 2009 and targets specifically 
deviations of production (difference between the nominated 
and the measured output, expressed in kW) originating from 
offshore wind power plants. It is settled per 15 minutes, per 
individual concession (Art. 2, KB 30/03/2009).  
It may be important to clarify the terminology of the 
“production deviation” used in this legislation. The meaning is 
explained in Art. 2 and refers to the difference between the 
nominated and the real-time measured power output. In case of 
wind power, the nominated output is generally determined by 
the predictions. It is important to emphasize the difference 
with the concept of imbalance which refers to the difference 
between injections and off-takes in a BRP’s portfolio. This 
encompasses the sum of all generation and load deviations. 
The core of this regulation is that for an individual offshore 
wind power plant, imbalances originating from offshore 
production deviations up to 30% of the nominated offshore 
capacity are to be bought or sold by Elia respectively at 90% 
or 110% of the Belpex Day-Ahead Market (DAM) reference 
market price. This mechanism is in fact similar to the normal 
imbalance settlement mechanism, except that now, when the 
wind farms’ production deviation reinforces the overall system 
imbalance, higher uncertain tariffs may be avoided. The 
remaining part of energy which corresponds to a production 
deviation exceeding the 30% margin is again subject to the 
normal imbalance settlement tariffs shown in Table 1. 
 
The mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 1 and Table 2: if for an 
offshore wind power plant, 200 MW is nominated for the first 
part of the day, all deviations inside 140 MW and 260 MW are 
settled with Elia at the advantageous tariff (90% / 110% of the 
Belpex DAM price). A positive imbalance, for instance a real-
time production of 280 MW at 7h00, is only for 20 MW 
subject to the normal imbalance settlement which might be 
higher than 10% of the market reference price. The first 60 
MW however falls within the tolerance margin.  
Table 3 and Table 4 built on the previous example by 
attaching the relevant imbalance tariffs. A situation is assumed 
where a BRP’s imbalance is entirely originating from the 
production deviation  of an offshore wind power plant. This 
wind power plant faces an electricity price of 40 €/MWh on 
the Belpex DAM and imbalance tariffs of 20/60 €/MWh when 
the imbalance reinforces the system imbalance.  
Comparing a scenario without (Table 3) and with (Table 4) 
tolerance margin, it can be seen that the regulation is 
specifically advantageous in situations where the BRP’s 
imbalance reinforces the system imbalance. Otherwise, when 
counter-acting on the system imbalance, wind power 
deviations falling under the tolerance margin are paid 
systematically 2% more in comparison with the normal 
settlement mechanism. Although the tolerance margin puts the 
wind power producer in disadvantage in these situations, this is 
largely compensated by the tariff reductions in the other case. 
To ensure grid stability, such support mechanism cannot be 
allowed to harm the incentive of the generator to minimise 
imbalances. This is assured in the regulation with a few 
specific conditions: 
-- The best forecasting tools available at reasonable price 
must be applied (Art. 4) after which the most accurate 
forecasts have to be nominated (Art. 2). Results and methods 
for forecasting must be extensively communicated with the 
grid operator (Art. 4). 
 
 
Fig. 1 Tolerance margin of 30% for offshore nomination of 200 MW 
(0h00-12h00) and 100 MW (12h00-24h00). 
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TABLE 2 
 IMBALANCE TARIFFS IN THE BELGIAN CONTROL ZONE (SOURCE: ELIA) 
 ≤ 30 % 
> 30 % 
Negative 
system 
imbalance 
Positive 
System 
Imbalance 
Positive 
imbalance BRP 
0,90 * Belpex 
DAM 
0,92 * Belpex 
DAM 
≤ 0,92 * Belpex 
DAM 
Negative 
imbalance BRP 
1,10 * Belpex 
DAM 
≥ 1,08 * Belpex 
DAM 
1,08 * Belpex 
DAM 
TABLE 3 
IMBALANCE COSTS FOR A WIND FARM WITHOUT 30% TOLERANCE MARGIN 
 
Positive system 
imbalance 
Negative system 
Imbalance 
Positive 
imbalance BRP 
(80 MW) 
80 MW * €20  = €1600 80 MW * 92% * 40€  = 
€2944 
Negative 
imbalance BRP 
(80 MW) 
80 MW * 108% * -40€  = 
€-3456 80 MW * €-60 = €-4800 
 
TABLE 4 
IMBALANCE COSTS FOR A WIND FARM WITH 30% TOLERANCE MARGIN 
 
Positive system 
imbalance 
Negative system 
Imbalance 
Positive 
imbalance BRP 
(80 MW) 
60 MW * 90% * €40 
+ 20 MW * €20 
= €2560 
60 MW * 90% * €40  
+ 20 MW * 92% * €40 
= €2896 
Negative 
imbalance BRP 
(80 MW) 
60 MW * 110% * €-40  
+ 20 MW * 108% * €-20 
= €-3504 
60 MW * 110% * €-40 
+ 20 MW * €-60  
= €-3840 
 
-- The transmission system operator respectively buys or 
sells the surplus or shortage of electrical energy caused by the 
imbalance at the Belpex reference market price (Art. 6) 
decreased or increased with 10%. This means that the 
generator is still penalised for its imbalance and the incentive 
to minimise is maintained. 
-- If the Intra-day Production mechanism is applied, the 
adapted nomination is used as a reference to calculate the 
deviation (Art. 3). The Intra-day Production mechanism (in 
place from 2009) allows a generator to change its nomination 
intra-day provided that the system operator approves this 
change. The new nomination has to be between the value of 
the last nomination and the prediction at the moment of 
submitting the intra-day nomination.  
A few critical remarks concerning this mechanism are to be 
made: first the advantageous tariffs are not consistent with the 
tariffs of the imbalance settlement. When this regulation was 
designed the minimum tariffs of the imbalance settlement 
mechanism were 90% or 110% of the market reference price. 
A few years ago, the general imbalance tariffs were adapted to 
92% and 108% which is not altered in the tolerance margin 
mechanism. 
A second remark is that the contractual structure of this 
regulation is rather complex (Fig. 2). The imbalance settlement 
mechanism is generally a relation between the BRP and the 
TSO as described in the previous section. This relation is 
largely maintained when applying the tolerance margin (Art. 
5). The BRP nominates and balances its position and is  
 
Fig. 2   Contractual representation of the 30% tolerance margin 
 
accountable for the aggregated imbalance of its portfolio. 
However, offshore deviations falling under the tolerance 
margin are bought or sold by the TSO from the concession 
holder (Art. 6). This results in a contractual relation between 
the TSO and the wind farm concession holder. The reference, 
the nomination is again delivered by the BRP (day-ahead, 
intra-day). These nominations submitted by the BRP are 
binding for the wind park concessionaire (Art. 7). The 
complexity of this relationship is that now, the BRP as well as 
the wind park developer become accountable for their 
deviations. This complexity can however be reduced if the 
concessionaire transfers all rights and duties concerning this 
rule to his BRP (Art. 7). 
A similar tolerance margin was installed in Spain with the 
second regulation (Spanish Royal Decree 436/2004). All wind 
power plants larger than 10 MW applying the feed-in tariff 
were obliged to predict the power output for every 60 minutes 
before 18h00 D-2. The absolute error between prediction and 
production was subject to an imbalance tariff when exceeding 
a tolerance margin of 20% [7]. This support mechanism 
disappeared in the third regulation (Royal Decree 661/2007). 
Wind power imbalances are today treated in the same way as 
under the feed-in premium system, it is namely fully 
responsible for its imbalances. 
III.  PREDICTABILITY AND PRODUCTION DEVIATIONS OF 
OFFSHORE WIND POWER PLANTS 
In this section, the underlying motivation of the 30%-
mechanism is briefly discussed, namely the higher 
unpredictability of wind resources at offshore locations. This 
assumption is often used as an argument by the advocates of 
the offshore tolerance margin.  
In order to address this research target, a preliminary 
analysis was performed for the North Sea area by the author in 
a separate paper [8]. Prediction error and resulting production 
deviations from five locations in the Netherlands were 
compared: two offshore locations (Vlakte Van De Raan and 
Lichteiland Goeree) are compared with three onshore sites 
(Eindhoven, Woensdrecht and Stavenisse) (Fig. 3) [9][10].  
Three common indicators are used to evaluate wind 
speed/power prediction errors: 
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-- Average error over the evaluation period (BIAS): 
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-- Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) 
   
, ,
1
1 ( )²
N
predicted i measured i
i
RMSE X X
N
=
= −∑
     (3) 
 
Results are summarised in Table 5 and Table 6 and it was 
concluded that it is not possible to reject the assumption of 
higher unpredictability and consequently higher imbalance 
volumes and costs offshore. However it is important to keep in 
mind that the difference is not that large and that the study is 
performed on a small population of five locations. Second, one 
can argue that offshore prediction tools are relatively new and 
more improvement in accuracy is expected in comparison with 
more mature onshore prediction tools.  
 
 
Fig. 3   Geographical representation of the three locations of measurement 
 
 
TABLE 5 
STATISTICAL PARAMETERS OF THE WIND SPEED PREDICTION ERROR 
[m./sec.] DE RAAN GOEREE STAVENISSE WOENSDR. EINDHOVEN 
BIAS -0,74 -0,87 0,16 0,57 0,65 
MAE 2,10 2,01 1,77 1,89 1,81 
RMSE 2,70 2,60 2,29 2,35 2,26 
 
 
TABLE 6 
NORMALISED STATISTICAL PARAMETERS CONCERNING IMBALANCE OF AN 
OFFSHORE WIND POWER PLANT   
[%] DE RAAN GOEREE STAVENISSE WOENSDR. EINDHOVEN 
NBIAS -5,05 -5,53 1,41 1,11 2,75 
NMAE 13,07 12,28 10,76 8,54 8,97 
NRMSE 19,39 18,53 16,66 13,13 13,95 
NMAX 79,26 89,00 78,96 66,32 80,39 
IV. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE TOLERANCE MARGIN 
SUPPORT MECHANISM 
In this section, the financial impact of the tolerance margin 
is studied for a virtual offshore wind power plant (100 MW). 
The cost of the mechanism is determined by comparing the 
scenario with and without tolerance margin. Imbalances 
resulting from the production deviations of a wind power plant 
are determined by subtracting the measured production from 
the predicted (nominated) production. As in this study, only 
the impact of a wind power plant is researched and not 
aggregated with any other deviations in the BRP’s portfolio, 
the total imbalance is assumed equal to the wind farm’s 
production deviation. 
 Imbalance volumes for the “Vlakte Van De Raan” are 
calculated with the available wind data and power curve. 
Measured wind speed are obtained from KNMI [9] and day-
ahead wind speed predictions (13h00, D-1) were delivered by 
ECN [10].  As regional normalised power curves are utilised 
[11], these results can be transposed to other installed 
capacities (as long as it evaluates a wind park in the same 
region). Therefore, it may be useful to express the production 
deviations as well in MWh as in percentage of the yearly 
production (Table 7). 
It was studied that 34,2% of the time, the imbalance falls 
entirely in the tolerance margin, meaning that the production 
deviation is lower or equal to 30% of the nominated output. In 
the final column of Table 7, the yearly imbalance volumes 
falling under the tolerance margin are reviewed as a 
percentage of the total imbalance volume: 42,7% of the total 
imbalance volume falls under the support mechanism. 
It has to be emphasized that these imbalances originate from 
day-ahead nominations. However, in reality, expected 
deviations after gate closure can be dealt with in different 
ways. Second, a BRP generally has a portfolio in which 
opposite deviations (other wind farms, demand, unexpected 
outages) may reduce the total imbalance. These assumptions 
result in an overestimation of the imbalances. The first one is 
dropped in the next section dealing with intra-day predictions. 
When the imbalances in Table 7 are charged with the 
imbalance tariff, this results in cash flows between the TSO 
and the BRP. These may be positive or negative depending on 
the direction of the imbalance, respectively if the BRP’s 
position is long or short. The total yearly cash flow is 
determined by aggregating these imbalance tariffs. The total 
cost for the TSO (or the final subsidy for offshore generation) 
of the tolerance margin is consequently calculated as the 
 
TABLE 7  
YEARLY IMBALANCE VOLUMES FOR AN OFFSHORE WIND PARK OF 100 MW  
 
Imbalance Volume Marge Volume 
% 
 
MWh % Total Prod. MWh % Total Prod. 
Imbalance  - 35.231 11,11% 22.003 6,94% 62,46% 
Imbalance + 79.616 25,11% 26.973 8,51% 33,88% 
TOTAL 114.847 36,22% 48.977 15,45% 42,65% 
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difference in cash flow between a scenario with and without 
tolerance margin. 
The imbalance tariffs were obtained from Elia and 
calculated with Belpex DAM electricity prices [12][13]. 
Applying time series of tariffs for 2008, the yearly cash flows  
are calculated for the two scenarios. Results in Table 8 show a 
net transfer from TSO to the BRP. This is explained by its 
average positive imbalance (surplus) caused by the systematic 
underestimation of the wind speeds which is shown in the 
previous section. In this study, the resolution of imbalances is 
one hour where in reality the imbalance settlement mechanism 
is accounted on a time-scale of 15 minutes. This may have a 
slight effect on the accuracy of the results.  
The financial impact of the subsidy for 2008 is showed in 
Table 7 and amounts to €5.422 per offshore installed MW. 
This cost can also be expressed in euro per offshore 
production resulting in €1,72  per MWh. This is an additional 
cost for the TSO as it reduces revenues from imbalance tariffs. 
For a yearly consumption of 90.000 GWh [14] in 2008 and an 
installed offshore capacity of 2.000 MW this would result in 
an increase of the electricity price with 0,12 €/MWh. 
The average electricity price in 2008 was 70,62 €/MWh 
which is exceptionally expensive compared to 2007 (41,78 
€/MWh) and 2009 (39,36 €/MWh). This consequently has a 
large influence on the imbalance prices and calculations were 
therefore repeated for 2009. Results in Table 9 show smaller 
cash flows and a decreasing effect on the cost of the subsidy. 
To examine parameters influencing the financial impact of the 
support mechanism, it can be expressed as: 
 
30% 30%
* * (1 )* * *
* *( )
* * *( )
TM
TM
IMB IMB IMB
IMB IMB
E TM
Cost Cashflow CashflowWithout
x V P x V P V P
x V P P
x V P P P
= −
= + − −
= −
= − (4)
 
  
 
x
 = fraction of imbalance volume falling under tolerance 
margin [%] 
 V = total imbalance volume [MWh] 
 
TMIMB
P = price imbalance falling inside tolerance margin                                 
 IMBP  = price imbalance tariff [€/MWh] 
 EP  = price electricity [€/MWh] 
 EP  = price electricity [€/MWh] 
 TMP  = 1,1 / 0,9 [€/MWh] 
 P   ≥ 1,08 / ≤ 0,92 [€/MWh] 
  
With this derivation, it can be concluded that the cost of the 
support mechanism depends on: the price of electricity which 
influences the imbalance tariffs; the imbalance volumes 
determined by the prediction tools and the direction of the 
imbalance as the subsidy only has a positive value if the 
imbalance is reinforcing the system imbalance. 
TABLE 8 
FINANCIAL CASH FLOWS IN 2008 CAUSED BY IMBALANCE SETTLEMENT FOR A 
WIND FARM OF 100 MW 
€ 
 
SHORT LONG NET € /MWh 
No 30% 
 
2.752.341 3.500.652 -748.311  
30% 
 
2.753.154 4.044.695 -1.291.542  
TOTAL 
 
 
 
542.231 1,71 
 
TABLE 9 
FINANCIAL CASH FLOWS IN 2009 CAUSED BY IMBALANCE SETTLEMENT FOR A 
WIND FARM OF 100 MW 
€ 
 
SHORT LONG NET € /MWh 
No 30% 
 
1.729.972 1.580.492 149.479  
30% 
 
1.703.842 2.004.192 -300.350  
TOTAL 
 
 
 
449.829 1,42 
V. INTRODUCTION OF INTRA-DAY MARKETS 
In this section, the impact on the imbalance volumes and by 
consequence on the imbalance support scheme is researched 
when introducing perfectly liquid intra-day markets. This 
scenario enables the possibility to adapt nominations 
according to intra-day predictions. 
Prediction error was again calculated with forecasts 
received from the ECN [10]. However, the forecast was 
received closer to real time (19h00) which should result in 
more accurate predictions. In Table 10, it can be seen that the 
effects depend on the used indicator but intra-day predictions 
improve the RMSE with 4,81% when reviewing the wind 
speed deviations and 2,99% when reviewing the active power 
deviation. Total imbalance volume decreases and consequently 
also the volume falling inside the tolerance margin (Table 11). 
The financial impact is that the cost of support is reduced 
with 3,5% for 2008 and -1,9% for 2009. Impact of these 
predictions closer to real-time are rather limited. Impact 
should however increase with closer prediction horizons and 
when prediction modelling reaches maturity. 
 
TABLE 10 
STATISTICAL PARAMETERS OF THE WIND SPEED PREDICTION ERROR AND 
IMBALANCE ACCORDING INTRA-DAY PREDICTIONS 
 
Prediction 
 error [m./sec.] 
 
 
Imbalance 
 [% inst. capacity] 
Bias (Mean) -0,75 -1,33% 
 
-5,42 +7,33% 
Mean Absolute Error 2,01 -4,26% 
 
12,60 -3,60% 
Root Mean Square Error 2,57 -4,81% 
 
18,82 -2,94% 
 
TABLE 11 
YEARLY IMBALANCE VOLUMES FOR A WIND POWER PLANT OF 100 MW WITH 
PERFECT INTRA-DAY MARKET 
 
Imbalance Volume Marge Volume 
 % 
 
MWh MWh  
Imbalance - 31,508 -10,58% 20.647 -6,16% 
 
65,53% 
Imbalance + 79,150 -0,59% 26.740 -0,86 
 
33,78% 
TOTAL 110,658 -3,65% 47.387 -3,25% 
 
42,82% 
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TABLE 12 
CASH FLOWS CAUSED BY IMBALANCE SETTLEMENT WITH PERFECT INTRA-DAY 
MARKETS FOR A WIND POWER PLANT OF 100 MW 
€ 2008 2009 
No 30 % -1.059.111  -30.788  
30 % -1.582.394  -472.081  
SUPPORT 523.283 -3,49 % 441.294 - 1,90 % 
Per MW 5.233  4.413  
Per MWh 1,65  1,39  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this paper is to review a specific Belgian 
regulation installing a tolerance margin for offshore production 
deviations leading to imbalances. Inside this margin of 30% of 
the nominated output, beneficial imbalance tariffs are enjoyed. 
Incentive is however maintained for the BRP to minimise 
imbalance volume and this support mechanism is creates only 
a financial compensation without worsening the impact on grid 
security. 
A preliminary study with five offshore and onshore 
locations confirms the argumentation of lower predictability 
offshore with prediction errors (RMSE) being 2-6% higher for 
offshore locations. Consequently, this increases imbalance 
costs and reduces market value of offshore wind power.  
Although this support mechanism can be defended as it 
directly tackles the imbalance cost, this regulation is anything 
but transparent. The complexity of the execution of this 
regulation raises the question if this support mechanism for 
offshore wind generation could not be replaced by other easier, 
transparent support mechanisms. The same support effect 
could for instance be achieved by increasing the minimal price 
of the green certificates received for renewable generation.  
The financial impact of the support mechanism was 
calculated by attaching the applicable tariff (based on the 
electricity price) on the imbalance volume. This results in 
€5.422 per installed MW of offshore capacity in 2008 which 
corresponds to a subsidy of €1,71 per offshore generated 
MWh. If for a wind park of 2 GW, this subsidy is passed 
towards the consumer trough transmission tariffs this would 
results in a increase of the price of electricity with €0,12 per 
consumed MWh. This subsidy increases with electricity price, 
the frequency of wind park imbalances reinforcing the system 
imbalance and the imbalance volume. When the same subsidy 
was calculated for a year with lower electricity prices (2009), 
this results in €4.498 per installed MW and €1,42 per 
produced MWh. 
When intra-day markets are enabled to correct nominations 
according to new predictions received after gate closure, this is 
expected to reduce imbalance volume, costs and the financial 
cost of the subsidy. Calculations were made for a received 
prediction update at 18h00. This results in a maximal decrease 
of RMSE of 3% leading to a 3,5% (2008) - 1,9% (2009) 
reduction in the subsidy per produced MWh.  
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